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REAL PROPERTY SUBLESSORS ESCAPE CERCLA 
OWNER LIABILITY IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
By Alison Sh/om* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
U
nder federa l law, a tenant who subleases a property to a 
sublessee who con taminates the site may be li able fo r 
c leanup costs depending on whi ch federal court hears 
the case.1 The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liabili ty Act 's (CERCLA) circul ar defin ition of a 
property "owner" has res ulted in a circuit spli t on thi s issue. 2 ln 
the Second Circui t, courts rely on a fi ve-factor tes t to determine 
owner li ability.3 In sharp contrast, the N inth C ircuit incorpo-
rates state-specific law to ass ign owner liabili ty.4 
The Second Circuit recently dec ided Next Millennium, LLC 
v. Adchem Corp.,5 where Pufa hl Realty, w hich changed its name 
to NSR Corp. and ass igned a ll of its assets to NS R Company 
(NSR), leased a building located at 89 Frost Street, North 
Hempstead, New York.6 NSR subleased the property from 1973 
to 1976 without the landlord 's consent or notice.7 The subles-
see, L inco ln , install ed a commercial dry cleaner that used large 
amounts of perchloroethy lene (PCE) in its da ily operations, 
which resulted in ground water contamination and required on-
site remediation. 8 Twenty years later, between 1997 and 1998, 
Next M illennium and l 0 I Frost (Next M ill ennium) purchased 
the contaminated pro perty, confi dent that they could recover 
upcoming cleanup ex penses fro m the prev ious sublesso r and 
sublessee as li able part ies .9 
Nex t Mi ll ennium claimed that NSR was a de facto owner 
at the time of contamination under a si te contro l theory of 
ownershi p.10 The Court of Appeals rejected a ll c lai ms, refer-
ring to the precedent set in Commander Oil v. Bario Equipment 
Corporation, 11 the contro l I ing ownership test at the time of the 
dec ision.12 ln Commander Oil, the Second Circuit establi shed 
a fi ve-fac tor test to determine ownership .13 The fi ve factors 
are: ( I ) the length of the lease and ri ghts of the owner/lessor to 
determine use of the prope1ty; (2) the terms of the lease allowing 
the owners to terminate the lease befo re it expires; (3) the ri ght 
of the lessee to sublet the property without notify ing the owner; 
(4) the lessee's responsibility to pay taxes, assessments, insur-
ance, and operation and maintenance costs; and (5) the lessee 's 
responsibili ty to make repairs. 14 The court fo und that NSR was 
not an owner under the Commander Oil test, and Linco ln , the 
original tenant corporation, had di sso lved by the time of sui t. 15 
Therefore, the sublessor and sublessee escaped contribution and 
jo int and severa l liability. 16 
Next M ill ennium fil ed a petition fo r certiorari with the 
Supreme Court, chall eng ing th e Commander Oil fi ve-fac tor 
test. 17 The petitioners argued that a sub lessor should be liabl e 
Fall 2018 
for costs of cleaning up contamination when the sublessor satis-
fi es the sta te-spec ifi c common law definiti on of "owner," had 
exc lusive site contro l, and polluted the site th rough its opera-
tions.1 8 The Supreme Court denied certiorari.19 
The Commander Oil test diverges fro m use of state-specific 
common law in ass igning ow ne r li ability under CERCLA, 
yet it remains the law in the Second C ircuit. 20 Consequently, 
a subsequent buyer such as Next M illennium- which had no 
s ite contro l at the time of the po llu ting event, did not sublease 
the property to po lluting sublessees, and did not profi t from the 
contamination- potenti a ll y bea rs the burden of pay ing for all 
c leanup costs wi thout contribution fro m other parties .21 
This comment argues that the Second C ircuit 's divergence 
fro m the state-spec ific common law regarding owner li abil ity 
under CERCLA is inconsistent w ith Congress's c lear intent, 
unlike the N inth Circuit's approac h, because it does no t incor-
porate state-spec ific common law and it separates "owner" from 
"operato r. " Part lI describes Congress 's intent for CERCLA li a-
bili ty.22 Part ll a lso explains the creation of the Second C ircuit 's 
ownershi p test, the Ninth Circuit's state-specific common law 
approac h to ownership , and the common law in New York and 
Cali fornia, respecti ve ly, regarding ownership .23 Part III argues 
that th e Second Circuit ownershi p test is inconsiste nt w ith 
Congress's intent for stri ct owner li abili ty by deviating fro m the 
state common law definiti on of"owner," while the N inth C ircuit 
approach provides a c lear guideline, using state common law to 
ass ign owner li abi lity under CERCLA.24 Part JV recommends 
that the Supreme Court or Congress overturn the Second Circuit 
ownership test because it is inconsistent w ith the remedial pur-
poses of CERCLA .25 This comment concludes that the Second 
C ircuit ownership test deters investors fro m purchas ing con-
taminated land due to the likelihood of litigati on on the indic ia 
of ownership.26 
II. BACKGROUND 
Hazardous waste sites pose a se ri ous threat to the e nviron-
ment and human hea lth .27 ln 1980, prior to an admini strative 
change, Congress acknowledged the significance of these harms 
and enacted CERCLA.28 
*Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2019, American Uni versity Washington College 
of Law; B.A. Environmental Studies, University of Colorado at Boulder. A spe-
c ial thank yo u to my fa ntastic edi tors for their time and ded ication ass isting on 
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A.CERCLA 
1. BACKGROUND AND CONGRESSIONAL f NTENT 
Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 to facilitate prompt 
cleanup of hazardous waste sites and place the financial bur-
den of environmental contamination on those responsible and 
benefitting from the externalized cost of the waste.29 Congress 
enacted CERCLA to impose liability for clean-up of land and 
water retroactively, lay out a process for identifying priority 
sites, and determine the appropriate response actions.30 
Under CERCLA, the government is authorized to respond 
to a release of a hazardous substance and then recover cleanup 
costs from potentially liable parties.31 Congress intended that 
courts hold liable those who are responsible for the contamina-
tion so long as the interpretation is supported expressly by the 
statute or by the legislative history. 32 
CERCLA lacked clarity, and in 1986, Congress clarified 
CERCLA with the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization 
Act (SARA). 33 Ten years later, in 1996, Congress made a 
second attempt at clarification with the Asset Conservation , 
Lender Liability, and Deposit Insurance Protection Act (ACA).34 
However, neither set of amendments clarified the basic meaning 
of the word "owner." 35 
For three decades , plaintiffs persuaded the courts that 
CERCLA's remedial purpose mandates a liberal interpretation 
and broad application of the statute.36 However, in CTS Corp. v. 
Waldburger,37 the Supreme Court explicitly urged lower courts 
to honor the statutory text.38 It is still unclear, however, whether 
lower courts are ready to accept Waldburger as the proverbial 
nail in CERCLA's broad remedial purpose 's coffin. 
2. LIABLE P ARTIES U NDER S ECTION 107 
CERCLA liability under Section 107 extends to four classes 
of potentially liable parties (PRPs).39 These classes include cur-
rent owners and operators of a property, certain past owners and 
operators, arrangers of disposal of hazardous waste, and trans-
porters of hazardous waste.4° Congress rejected a general causa-
tion formula that would assign liability for contamination based 
on a party 's connection to the site.41 This distinction holds own-
ers and operators liable for contaminated facilities and facilities 
that show a threat of contamination regardless of whether the 
owner or operator caused the contamination.42 
The statutory language is circular and vaguely defines 
an owner and operator as "any person owning or operating" 
contaminated property.43 The circular definition of owner and 
operator gave courts the discretion to assign meaning to the 
statutory language and therefore govern CERCLA liability.44 
Congress intended that courts decide the circumstances under 
which a holder of a less-than-fee-simple interest in real property 
is subject to owner liability, but the definition remains indeter-
minate and creates confusion in the enforcement of the statute.45 
Ownership of land under CERCLA is a property issue, and 
property law questions are traditionally a matter of state law.46 
The Supreme Court established that state courts determine prop-
erty interests based on their own rules .47 The Supreme Court 
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clarified in United States v. Bestfoods48 that when Congress gave 
the word "operator" a circular definition, the definition should 
be based on the plain meaning of the word and state common 
law.49 The Second Circuit interpreted Bestfoods to distinguish 
"owner" and "operator," while the Ninth Circuit interpreted 
Bestfoods as direction to follow the state common law definition 
of "owner. "50 
3. JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY U NDER CERCLA 
CERCLA is a strict liability statute and imposes liability 
on some parties who may not have acted culpably.51 By the 
time Congress enacted CERCLA, courts had established that in 
pollution cases where two or more defendants cause indivisible 
harm, the defendant could seek contribution from their joint 
tortfeasors. 52 Harm at a CERCLA site is usually indivisible,53 
and therefore courts hold defendants jointly and severally liable 
under CERCLA.54 
Congress deleted CERCLA's original joint and several 
liability section, saying that the standard should be the same as 
the Clean Water Act Section 31 I .55 However, Courts have deter-
mined that Congress intended that courts incorporate joint and 
several liability principles in judicial interpretation.56 Congress 
envisioned that doctrines of federal common law govern liabil-
ity issues of federal government interest that are not resolved 
expressly in CERCLA.57 
The Second Restatement of Torts makes joint and several 
liability the presumption .58 When the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) immediately cleans up a CERCLA site, courts 
assign joint and several liability to the liable parties.59 On the 
other hand, when the harm is less immediate, a private party 
may clean up the CERCLA site, and courts assign either joint 
and several or several liability to parties who are liable.60 
4. THE RIGHT TO S EEK CONTRIBUTION U NDER SECTION 113(F) 
Congress amended CERCLA in 1986 with SARA to permit 
private persons to sue to recover at least some of their cleanup 
costs from other PRPs under Section l B(f).61 This amendment 
created a separate federal cause of action and eased the burden 
of the original defendant sued by the EPA.62 A defendant who is 
found liable under Section 107 is entitled to relief under Section 
113(f) by seeking contribution from other PRPs if the defen-
dant can demonstrate divisibility of the environmental harm.63 
The court may allocate costs as it determines appropriate.64 In 
Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc. 65 and United 
States v. Atlantic Research Corp ,66 the Supreme Court held that 
a private party who has not been sued under CERCLA 106 or 
107(a) may not obtain contribution under 113(f)(l) from other 
liable parties. 67 These cases modified the extent of contribu-
tion rights and limited the ability of private parties to recover 
response costs. 68 
5. THE BONA FIDE PROSPECTI VE P URCHASER D EFENSE TO 
CERCLA LIABILITY 
Investors that conduct Environmental Site Assessments 
may be exempt from CERCLA liability under the " bona fide 
prospective purchaser" (BFPP) exemption.69 The application 
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of the BFPP provision became clearl y enforceable for ten-
ants under the Brownfields Utili zation , Investment, and Local 
Development Act of 201 8. 70 A tenant whose lease of a property 
began after January 11 , 2002 can establi sh a BFPP defense to 
CERCLA owner liability, and thereby escape liability when 
leas ing previously-contaminated property. 7 1 
B. CI RCUIT S PLI T IN APPROACHING O WNER L IA BILITY 
UNDER CERCLA 
The circul ar defi niti on of a property "owner" under 
CERCLA has resulted in a circuit split. 72 In the Second Circuit, 
courts depend on a fi ve-fac tor test to determine owner liability. 73 
The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, incorporates state-specific 
law to ass ign owner li abili ty.74 
1. T HE S ECOND CIRCUIT O WNERSHIP T EST 
Under New York common law, tenants (and not landlords) 
are held responsibl e for injury caused by the condition of use 
of leased property. 75 To interpret state environmental statutes, 
New York courts fo llow the principle that tort liability concern-
ing property depends on occupation and control. 76 However, the 
Second Circuit fra mework fo r CERCLA owner liability does not 
fo llow thi s principle. 77 
ln Commander Oil, the Second Circuit generated a new 
five -fac tor factor test to determine de facto ownership ofa lessee 
under CERCLA.78 Commander Oil owned a lot that Bario sub-
leased to Pas ley.79 The subleased lot housed petroleum storage 
tanks, and Pas ley used the lot to repackage so lvents purchased in 
bulk and to reclaim and revitalize used so lvents.80 The EPA di s-
covered contamination and remedi ated the site, and Commander 
Oil agreed to reimburse the EPA fo r costs.8 1 Commander Oil 
sought contribution under CERCLA from Bario and Pas ley as 
potentiall y li able parti es. 82 The court fo und that Bario did not 
possess suffic ient "attributes of ownership" because all factors 
showed that Bario did not have the rights and obligations of an 
owner.83 
The Second Circuit ' s definition of "owner" is not deter-
mined by state law. 84 In Bestfoods , the Supreme Court dif-
fe rentiated "owner" from "operator."85 As the Supreme Court 
c larified, Congress intended that the court use plain meaning 
of the word "operator" and state common law as bedrock prin-
ciples . 86 The Second C ircuit interpreted Bestfoods to defin e 
"owner" and "operator" as di sjuncti ve. 87 Disjunctive definiti ons 
lead to a limited interpretation of liability and the Second Circuit 
fra mework incentivizes litigation.88 
2. T HE NINTH CIRCUIT COMMON L AW O WNERSHIP T EST 
By contrast, the Ninth Circuit fo llows the Supreme Court's 
guidance in Bestfoods and uses state common law to determine 
owner li ability under CERCLA .89 Cali fo rnia common law 
di stingui shes between possessory interests, such as revocable 
permits and ownershi p interests. 90 
The N inth Circ uit used state common law when examining 
whether an easement constitutes ownership for CERCLA liabil-
ity in Long Beach Unified School District v. Dorothy B. Goodwin 
California Living Trus t.9 1 The easement holders (M&P) ran 
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a non-polluting pipeline across a parce l of land .92 The local 
school di strict sued the tenant who maintained a waste pit that 
contaminated the land, and the tenant settled.93 The local school 
di stri ct also sued M&P under CERCLA for contribution, even 
though the pipeline had no connecti on to the waste pit. 94 T he 
court fo und that holding an easement does not itself constitute 
"ownership" in relevant civil state property law because an ease-
ment is merely a limited ri ght to use property that is possessed 
by another enti ty.95 
In City of Los Angeles v. San Pedro Boat Works ,96 Pac ifi c 
American, whose successor-in-interest was S CI Coca-Co la, 
possessed revocable permits fro m the City of Los Ange les fo r 
Berth 44 boat works. 97 The City found contamination on the s ite 
and claimed that BCI Coca-Cola was li able as an owne r under 
CERCLA.98 The N inth Circuit he ld that BCI Coca-Cola mere ly 
held possessory in terests and therefore was not an owner.99 The 
court lim ited owner li ability to those who hold the "sti cks in the 
bundle ofrights." 100 
In El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. United States , 10 1 the Distr ic t 
Court of Arizona recognized that a party holding a fee title could 
have less than absolute ownership.102 However, it also held that 
a fee title holder with plenary and supervisory powers is liable 
as an owner under CERCLA. 103 The United States ma intained 
power over the reservation land at the time of the contamination 
and thus was deemed liable under CERCLA as an owner. 104 
III. ANALYSIS 
A . THE S ECOND CIRCU IT DIVERG ED FROM 
C ONGRESS IONAL INTENT BY CREATING A F EDERAL T EST 
FOR O WNERS HIP AND S EPARATING " O WNER" FROM 
" O PERATOR. " 
W hen enacting CERCLA, Congress empowered courts to 
interpret li ability.105 However, a court must fo ll ow Congress 's 
intent to develop the common law fo r CERCLA ownership 
liability, place the financial burden of environmenta l contamina-
tion on those responsible and benefi tting fro m the acti vities that 
caused the waste, and interpret the statute broadly and liberally 
so long as the interpretation is supported express ly in the statute 
or through legislati ve history. 106 The Second Circuit 's five -
factor test for determining ownership does not fo llow state com-
mon law and does not a llow Congress's goa ls for CERCLA to 
manifes t. 107 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit uses the state-specific 
property law definiti on of "ownership ." 108 The Ni nth C ircuit 's 
interpretation of CERCLA liability offers clear guidelines fo r 
investors in land and therefore incentiv izes early settlements, as 
intended by Congress.109 
J. THE SECOND C IRCUIT'S O WNERSHIP T EST F ACTORS 
ARE S USCEPTIBLE TO MA NIPULATION IN LITIGATION W HICH 
CREATES A B ARRJER FOR I N VESTMEN T. 
The Second C ircuit created a fi ve-factor ownership test to 
limit the site contro l ownership test and to separate "owner" 
from "operator." 11 0 The judge-made test for ownership applies 
to both Section l 07 a nd Secti on l I 3(f) of CERCLA, whi ch 
allow the government to recoup financial losses and fo r private 
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parti es to split the costs of contamination c leanup among other 
PRPs. 111 The Commander Oil test is an expanded vers ion of the 
s ite-control test, w hich Second Circuit courts rej ected fo r being 
overbroad . 11 2 
Whil e the N inth Circ ui t fo ll ows a state comm on law 
a pproach , as instructed by both legis lat ive hi s tory a nd the 
Supreme Court in Bestfoods, the Second C ircuit di verged fro m 
the sta te commo n law defi niti on of owne rship when deciding 
Commander Oil by creating thi s five-facto r ow nership test. 11 3 
Congress's re media l goa ls in enacting CERCLA were to fac ili-
ta te prompt c leanup of hazardous waste s ites and to ho ld parti es 
li able who were ultimately respons ible fo r the contamination, 
de pe ndent o n the facts of the case . 11 4 rn particul ar, Congress 
intended the p rinc iples of state commo n law govern li ability 
issues not reso lved express ly in CE RCLA beca use common 
law principles are traditiona l and evolving . 11 5 While presenting 
the fi na l, compro mi sed CERC LA bill , Senator R ando lph and 
Representative F lorio express ly encouraged the development of 
common law in de termining the liability of j o int tortfeasors who 
are responsible fo r the costs of cleanup unde r CER CLA , w hich 
would, in turn , promote uni fo rmity of in terpretatio n of the stat-
ute .116 The Second C ircuit 's fi ve-factor test expands on the site 
contro l test ra ther than fo llowing the state-specific defi ni tion of 
"owner," a nd therefore, the Second Circ ui t's method for defining 
ownership under CER CLA is inco nsistent w ith Congress ional 
intent. 11 7 
In addi t io n to apply in g state co mm o n law, Co ng ress 
intended that CER CL A incenti vize q ui ck c lean-up of con-
taminated land , w hich requires that courts gran t incenti ves for 
investors to buy and c lean contaminated land effic iently, uch as 
a streamlined path to receive contributi on from other PRPs. 11 8 
The Second C ircuit 's fi ve-factor Commander Oil ownership test 
is eas ily m anipulated, thereby incentiv iz ing li tigation.11 9 Due 
to thi s manipulatio n, a party w ho seeks contr ibution fro m other 
PRPs may not be able to obtain such contribution.120 This test 
goes aga inst the purpose of CERCLA and does not prov ide a 
suffi c ient incentive to avo id contamination of land. 121 As ev i-
de nced in Next Millennium, the Second C ircuit ho lds a subse-
quent purc haser so lely liable based o n a federa l j udge-made law 
that contradicts the state pro perty law, w hi ch may have required 
contributio n from the prio r lessee that sublet the faci lity to a 
contaminating sublessee. 122 
Congress enacted CERC LA to place the fi nancial burden of 
env ironmenta l contam ination on those responsible and benefi t-
ting fro m the activities that caused the waste. 123 As a result of 
the Commander Oil ownership test, a subsequent owner in the 
Second Circuit who had no s ite contro l, did not sublease the 
p roperty to the po lluting subl essees, and did not profit fro m the 
contamination bears the burde n of providing a ll cleanup costs. 124 
M eanwhile, sublessors who had s ite control and occupation of 
the fac ili ty a t the time of conta minati on escape ownership li abil -
ity because the lease is des ignated as typica l and does not trans-
fer ownership to the lessee. 125 The Commander Oil ownership 
test does not fo ll ow the Cong ressional intent to put the financial 
burden of cleanup on a ll part ies who are resp onsibl e fo r the land 
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contamination.126 Additionall y, Commander Oil diverges fro m 
congress iona l intent because the test re li eves sublesso rs from 
owner li ability despite acting as an owner. 127 The Ninth Circuit 
has di scredited and rej ected Commander Oil as improper in 
determining ownership liability under CERCLA, demonstrating 
the Second C ircuit 's di vergence fro m the intended common law 
application of owner liabili ty. 128 
Rather than defining "owner" under CERCLA as deter-
mined by sta te law, the Second C ircuit 's federal judge-made 
law mere ly ex panded the s ite-contro l test. 129 Under New 
York Common Law, tena nts and hot landl ords are gener-
a lly held responsible fo r injury caused by leased property. 130 
Additionally, New Yo rk courts fo llow the principle that li abili ty 
in tort concerning property genera ll y depends on occupation and 
contro l. 131 ln Commander Oil, the Second C ircuit dec lined to 
fo llow the settled principles of ew York common law, which 
provide an easy standard to meet " ownership" and therefore 
is a more expansive approach and holds more PRPs li ab le for 
c leanup costs .132 The Second C ircuit's approach to ownership 
li abili ty has more fac tors to consider, which resul ts in a na rrower 
fra mework fo r owner liabili ty under CERCLA. 133 
In addition to its inconsistency with Congress iona l intent to 
fo llow state common law, the Second Circuit 's interpretation of 
CERCLA li abili ty in Commander Oil limi ts the reach of owner 
li abili ty by defi ning "owner" as separate fro m "operator."134 In 
determining whether Bari o was an "owner" and therefore li able 
fo r contribution, the Second C ircui t's Commander Oil owner-
ship test rejected the common law site contro l test fo r ownership 
li abil ity, reasoning that thi s definiti on of "owner" is too similar 
to "operator." 135 The Second Ci rcui t looked to Bestfoods, and 
interpreted the Supreme Court's dec ision to mean that courts 
sho uld di stingui sh "owner" and "operator. " 136 In Commander 
Oil, the court reasoned that contro l over a fac ility could establish 
operation, so if site contro l could also establi h ownership, then 
operation would be merely a subset of ownership .137 However, 
the rule of dec ision fo r the term "operator" in Bestfoods is analo-
gous to the term "owner" because Congress gave both terms cir-
cul ar defi niti ons in CERCLA.138 Therefore, the Second Circuit 
did not fo llow the Supreme Court 's precedent and rely on tate 
common law to defi ne "owner" when the statute prov ides a cir-
cular definition of the term .139 The Second Circui t's ownership 
test does not support the ew York common law princ iple in 
determining ownership under CERCLA and is inconsistent w ith 
legislative hi story. 140 
Furthermore, the Second C ircuit mi s interprets Secti ons 
I 07(a)( l) and (2) of CERCLA by separating owner and operator 
li ability. 141 Congress ass igns li ability to owners, operators, or 
both under CERC LA.142 Sections 107(a)( I) and (2) ofCERCLA 
use "and" and "or" interchangeabl y. 143 Owner and operator sub-
stanti ally overl ap in the language of the statute; thus courts are 
instructed by the language to interpret them overlapping rather 
than as a lternatives. 144 If Congress intended owners and opera-
tors to be separate and not overl apping, they would always use 
"or" or would write " the owner and the operator" rather than 
" the owner and operator." 145 
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2. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S CONSTRUCTION OF O WNER 
LIABtl!TY H ows LIABLE B oTH THE P ASSIVE TITLE O wNER 
OF R EAL PROPERTY WHO A CQUIESCES IN A NOTHER 's 
CONTAMINA TION AND THE A CTIVE O PERATOR OF THE 
F AC/llTY. 
Congress intended for courts to deve lop a state common 
law definiti on of "owner." 146 The N inth Circuit appli es the 
common law definition of "owner" to de te rmine whether to 
ass ign liability under CERCLA Sections I 07 and I 13(f). 147 The 
N inth Circuit, but not the Second Circuit, has uni formly applied 
CERCLA owner li ability as intended by Congress by deve loping 
the state common law definition of"owner." 148 
The N inth Circuit has followed legislati ve intent by incor-
porating the state-specific definition of "owner" from relevant 
property law cases .149 The inth Circuit focuses on case law 
rather than the immediate and unique facts of each case, and 
questions the role of " indic ia of ownership." 150 The N inth 
Circu it courts continue to develop a consistent comm on law def-
inition of "owner" to determine owner liab ili ty under CERCLA 
by relying on principles such as expansions and adaptati ons of 
the site control test to determine ownership .15 1 
The in th Circuit has developed the common law distinc-
tion of whether an easement holder is an owner, thereby honor-
ing Congressional intent to apply the state-specific definition 
of "owner." 152 The N inth Circuit 's potential "bundle of rights" 
exception to the common law di st inction between possesso ry 
and ownership rights di ffers from the Commander Oil test 
because the bundle of rights exception limits li abi lity to those 
who enjoy the rights of ownership, whi le the Commander Oil 
tes t is an expanded vers ion of the s ite control test. 153 
The N inth Circui t's framework for assigning owner li ab ili ty 
has deve loped by incorporating state common law, as Congress 
intended. 154 In Long Beach, the inth Circui t looked to both 
federal and Ca li fo rni a common law to determine the definition 
of "owner" in regards to CERCLA liability.155 The court noted 
that c ircular defi nitions within a statute show Congress ional 
intent for courts to apply "ordinary meanings" rather than 
unusua l or technical alternative meanings. 156 The com mon 
law clearly states that there is a distinction between holding an 
easement and owning the contaminated land.157 Therefore, the 
court applied this definition and found that merely holding an 
easement is not suffi cient to constitute "ownership" for purposes 
of CERCLA li ability.158 In San Pedro , w hich a lso took place 
in Ca li forni a, the court continued to build upon the Ca li fo rni a 
common law, inc luding the holding from Long Beach, and fur-
ther di stingui shed between ownership interests and possessory 
interests. 159 In San Pedro, the court fo und that site contro l was 
not enough, and built upon the site control test with state com-
mon law regarding a fee titl e owner 's control over a permittee 's 
use of the property. 160 
Unlike the Second Circuit, the inth C ircuit fo llows state 
common law and thus imposes liability on ly on parties respon-
sib le under state law providing clear guide I in es fo r investors 
in land .16 1 In enacti ng CERCLA, Congress intended to place 
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the financ ia l burden of contamination on those w ho were actu-
a ll y responsible, based on the fo ur categories under CERCLA 
Section I 04 rather than by causation. 162 In El Paso Natural 
Gas, the N inth C ircuit recognized that a party holding the fee 
title could have less than abso lute ownership, but that a fee 
title holder with plenary and supervisory powers constitutes an 
owner that is liable under CERCLA, and therefore the court held 
the superv isor of the fac ili ty liable for the contamination. 163 The 
defendants, who he ld fee title and substantial powers over the 
land , contributed to the costs of cleanup. 164 This interpretat io n 
of CER CLA liability under Sections 107 and I I 3(f) supports 
the statute's remedia l purpose of holding liable those who were 
ultimate ly respons ibl e and who may have benefi tted from the 
externa li zed cost of contamination, or who were otherwise con-
nected with the contaminated site.165 
The N inth C ircuit has taken an ap proach that foc uses o n 
applying state common law and fulfilling the remedial purposes 
of the CERCLA statute.166 By fo llowing the state common law 
definition of "owner," a sub lessor in the N inth Circui t who has 
site contro l and otherwise acts as an owner of the fac ili ty is 
likely to be liable as an owner under CERCLA fo r the remedial 
costs of contamination by thei r subl essees. 167 
B. THE S u BLEssoR IN NEXT MILLE ruM Wo LD HAVE 
BEE H ELD LIABLE IF THE SECO D CIRCUIT USED THE 
NINTH CIRCU IT FRAM EWORK FOR CERLCA O WN ER 
LIAB ILITY. 
In Department of Tox ic Substances Control v. Hearthside 
Residential Corp.,168 the inth Circu it defined current owner 
and operator status under CERCLA at the time c leanup costs are 
incurred rather when a recovery lawsuit seeking re imbursement 
is fi Jed. 169 Subsequent purchasers who incur the cost of c leanup, 
therefore, are cons idered current owners of a property. 170 
Fo llowing this precedent, ext Millennium was held li ab le as 
the current owner in Next Millennium rather than the orig inal 
polluter. 17 1 However, Next Millennium could have sought con-
tribution from the prev ious owners under Section l l3(f). 172 
The Second C ircuit tried Next Millennium and , as a result, 
the subseq uent purchaser of the property- w ho had no s ite 
contro l at the time of the contamination, did not sublease the 
property, and did not profit from the contamination- bore the 
burden of provi ding a ll cleanup costs. 173 Next M ill e nnium 
sought contr ibution from the sublessors for cleanup costs of the 
contamination to 89 Frost Street under CERCLA Sections l 07 
and l I 3(t). 174 The Second Circuit did not have the authority to 
overrul e the Commander Oil test, and as a result, the tenants , 
who sublet the property to a contami nating subtenant, escaped 
ownership li abili ty. 175 
When Congress enacted CERCLA, it intended the statute 
to fac ilitate prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites and place 
the financial burden of env ironmental contamination on those 
responsible for and benefitting from the activities that caused 
the waste. 176 Furthermore, Congress intended that courts con-
s ider legislati ve hi story wh ile interpreting the plain language 
of the statute. 177 If the Second Circuit ruled cons istently with 
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congress ional intent and applied New York's common law in 
N ext Millennium, the sublessor may have been held liable as an 
owner. 178 
The Second Circuit misinterpreted the statutory language of 
CERCLA Sections 107(a)(l) and 107(a)(2) in Next Millennium 
by defining "owner" and "operator" as completely separate 
terms. 179 The court would not have di stinguished between 
owner and operator if it had fo llowed Congress 's intent and the 
language of the statute because the statute uses "owners and 
operators" and "owners or operators" interchangeably. 180 By 
using these terms interchangeably, Congress intended that the 
terms overlap. 181 
T he Next Millennium sublessor would have like ly passed 
the common law test for ownership because the sublessor leased 
to the sublessee without notice or consent of the landowner. 182 
San Pedro Boat Works shows that the "bundle of rights" excep-
tion in the Ni nth C ircuit covers this type of control over land .183 
Under New York common law, courts generally look to occupa-
tion and contro l of the site. 184 The sublessor in Next Millennium 
exercised contro l over the faci lity at 89 Frost Street at the time 
that the sublessee contaminated the faci lity, and therefore the 
Second C ircuit would have likely held the sublessor li ab le if it 
applied ew York common law to assess the sublessor's owner-
ship status. 185 This is unlike 3550 Stevens Creek Associates v. 
Barclays Bank, 186 where the inth Circuit did not extend owner 
li abi lity to past and present owners of commercial buildings 
containing asbestos. 187 However, contamination of PCE is com-
monly tried in CERCLA cases and is at the heart ofCERCLA. 188 
The limitation in 3550 Stevens Creek Associates wou ld likely 
not app ly to N ext Millennium because there was more relevant 
common law regarding PCE contam ination than there was com-
mon law for commercia l buildings conta ining asbestos. 189 The 
Second Circuit did not fo llow a state common law approach and 
instead followed the Commander Oil five-factor test, which is 
judge-made law. 190 Despite there being no authority that lim-
its ownership to one party, the Second C ircuit 's interpretation 
focused on whether the sublessor was either an operator or an 
owner.1 91 
It is likely that the inth Circuit would distinguish Next 
Millennium from other N inth Circuit cases that find easement 
holders are not held li ab le as owners under CERCLA. 192 Jn San 
Pedro Boat Works , Pacific American, whose successor-i n-inter-
est was BCI Coca-Co la, possessed revocable permits from the 
City of Los Angeles for ten months for Berth 44 boat works and, 
after the city investigated the s ite, found that it was contam inat-
ed .193 The c ity claimed that BCI Coca-Cola was liab le as an 
owner under CERCLA during the contamination.194 The court 
followed Long Beach and looked to the common law definition 
of "owner," including California common law which said that 
there is a distinction between holding an easement and owning 
the contaminated land. 195 T he court distinguished between own-
ership interests and possessory interests and held that because 
Pacific American was a ho lder of mere possessory interests, 
BCI Coca-Cola was not an owner and therefore not held li ab le 
as an owner. 196 San Pedro Boat Works and Long Beach would 
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be distinguished from Next Millennium because common law 
differs from New York to Cali fo rnia, and New York common 
law regarding property typically holds tenants liable for tort 
caused by actions on a property.197 Unlike in San Pedro Boat 
Works and Long Beach, the defendants in Next Millennium held 
ownership interests because they subleased the property without 
notice or consent from the landlord and were, therefore, owners 
in effect. 198 The Ninth Circuit rejected the Second Circuit inter-
pretation of owner liabili ty, further showing the contrast of the 
likely outcome ifthe Second Circu it tried Next Millennium using 
the inth Circuit's reasoning. 199 The Second Circuit, using the 
same approach as the Ninth Circu it, should have applied New 
York common law standard when deciding Next Millennium by 
using an occupation and site control test.200 
The inth Circuit would have likely held the sub lessor 
li ab le as an owner under CERCLA because Congress intended 
that the courts would broadly and liberally app ly CERCLA lia-
bility.201 Setting precedent that holds a sublessor liable would 
be considered a libera l interpretation of the statute.202 The 
inth Circuit wou ld have prioritized liberal interpretation of the 
statute because it fo llows the Congressional intent for CERCLA 
liab ility.203 This finding would be simil ar to El Paso Natural 
Gas because the defendants were found li ab le as owners despite 
having granted significant property interests to another party.204 
In both cases, the defendants held substantial powers over the 
property. 205 However, the Second Circuit's Commander Oil test 
narrowly interprets CERCLA liabi lity.206 
The Ninth Circuit's approach does not focus on the unique 
facts of a case, unlike the Second Circuit. 207 Therefore, the 
inth Circu it's approach to CERCLA owner liabi lity in Next 
Millennium would have foc used on the relevant common law 
regarding subleases rather than the Commander Oil five-factor 
test.208 This finding wou ld have turned out differently if tried in 
the inth Circu it; if a court looks to the common law rather than 
to the unique facts of the case, then the five-factors may not be 
addressed in considering whether the sublessor is an "owner."209 
ln ew York, common law for liabi li ty in tort generally depends 
on occupation and contro l.210 The sublessor in Next Millennium 
had control over the property, and therefore, the Ninth Circuit 
would have likely fo und that the sublessor was an owner under 
CERCLA Sections l 04 and l I 3(f) to contribute to cleanup costs 
of the contami nation.211 
The court wou ld have likely placed the financial burden 
on the sublessor because the sublessor was ultimately respon-
sib le for the contamination .212 Congress intended to hold those 
responsible for contamination li ab le to pay for the cleanup.213 
The Ninth Circuit 's interpretation of CERCLA liability focuses 
on the remedial aspect of the statute .214 The sublessor in Next 
Millennium wou ld ultimately be responsible for the contamina-
tion because it subleased the fac ility to contaminating sublessees 
without the consent or notice of the landlord and had full control 
over the facility.215 Additiona ll y, the sublessor profited substan-
tially from the sublease, which is a significant indicator that it 
would bear the financial burden of cleanup if the Second Ci rcuit 
had followed the Ni nth C ircuit 's correct interpretation of the 
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statute. 2 16 The original purpose behind CERCLA was to ho ld 
parties liable fo r contamination who are ultimate ly responsible 
fo r the contamination, and so looking to who had control of the 
site at the time of the contamination is an acceptable means of 
determining who is li able as an owner under CERCLA.2 17 
The N inth C ircuit also wo uld have like ly he ld the subl es-
sors li able as owners, so that the landowner could rece ive 
contribution because the Ninth Circui t has p revious ly provided 
an incentive fo r private parti es to pay fo r c leanup or to sett le 
with the confi dence that they can be recuperated by other poten-
ti a ll y li able parti es. 2 18 The Second Circuit 's ho lding in Next 
Millennium sets a precedent for fu ture potentially li able parties 
to refuse to remediate a si te and encourages litigation on the 
Commander Oil five-factor test rather than settlement. 2 19 The 
N inth Circuit knowingly rej ected the Commander Oil five-facto r 
test and therefore avoided these legislative issues fo r a statute 
that is already heav il y litigated.220 
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
The di sposal of hazardous waste endangers publi c hea lth 
and the environment. 221 The Uni ted States has many co n-
taminated sites, and Congress enacted CERC LA to quickly and 
effecti ve ly clean these sites by encouraging pri vate part ies to 
vo luntarily clean up contaminated sites .222 The Supreme Court 
of the Uni ted States declined the opportunity to correct the 
Second Circuit 's Commander Oil test by denying certiorari in 
Next Millennium .223 As a res ult, confus ion remains as to w hat 
land investors can expect when buyi ng contaminated property in 
the Second Circui t. 224 
The Commander Oil facto r tes t prov ides an un pred ict-
able outcome which incenti vizes litigati on rather than ea rl y 
settlement, and thi s is aga inst CERCLA's re med ial purpose.225 
Investors are more like ly to buy land if they can be confident 
that other PRPs will share the fi nancial burden of c leanup.226 
l f litigation is required to ensure contribution of other PRPs, 
investors are less likely to invest, and the contaminated sites w ill 
remain contaminated. 227 The Second Circuit 's Commander Oil 
test to determine owner liabili ty is fl ex ible and nebulous, creat-
ing an unpredictable barrier for investors and therefore investors 
are less likely to invest in contaminated land .228 
The N inth Circuit adhered to the interpretation of owner 
as fo und in Ca li fo rni a common law, which prov ides c lear 
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expectations for investo rs of land.229 Unlike the Second C ircui t, 
the N inth Circui t reached a proper interpretatio n of CERCLA 
ownership li abili ty by placing those li able who were responsible 
for the contamination, because it fo llows state common law and 
thus provides clear guidelines fo r investors in land.230 
T he Second Ci rcui t has stated that it does not have the 
authority to overturn the Commander Oil ownership test itse lf, so 
the Supreme Court or Congress must overturn the Commander 
Oil ownership test. 23 1 Congress quickly drafted the la nguage 
of CERCLA, and Congress could fi x its mistake by ame nding 
the statute to set a clear path for establi shing CERCLA liability 
aga inst a tenant of a fac ility.232 An easy so lu tion that would 
still a llow states to incorporate state-spec ific defi ni tions of com-
mon law would be to add "and/or" when di scussing " owner 
and operator" and "owner or operator. "233 This solution wo uld 
c larify Congress's intent to extend li ability and would invalidate 
the Second C ircuit 's current approach. 234 A lternati ve ly, the 
Supreme Court should overturn the five -facto r test in favor of 
a defi nition of "owner" based on state-spec ific property law.235 
V. CONCLUSION 
Despite a di vergence fro m use of state-spec ific common law 
in ass igning owner li abili ty under CERCLA, Commander Oil 
remains the law in the Second Circu it.236 Consequently, a sub-
seq uent buyer who has no site contro l at the ti me of the pollu ting 
event, does not sublease the property to po lluti ng sublessees , 
and does not profit fro m the contamination may bear the burden 
of providi ng a ll cleanu p costs and may not receive contri bu-
tion fro m other potentia ll y li ab le parties if bring ing the ir case 
in the Second Circui t. 237 On the other hand, the N inth C ircui t, 
which fo llows a clear state definiti on of"owner" that can pred ict 
whether PR.Ps will settle, fulfill s Congress 's intent and continues 
to incentivize private cleanup of contami nated s ites.238 
After Next Millennium, it is likely that lawyers in the Second 
C ircui t will advise their c lients to beware of purchasing con-
taminated land due to the likeliness of litigation on the indic ia 
of ownership .239 As a result, contaminated sites in the Second 
C ircuit on the Nationa l Priorities L ist w ill remain stagnant, and 
contamination will continue to damage the environment and cre-
ate further risks fo r public health .240 !Ji 
(E.D .. Y. Mar. 23 , 20 16), ajf'd sub nom. ex t M illenn ium Rea lty, LLC v. 
Adchem Corp., 690 F. App ' x 7 10 (2d Cir. 20 17), cerl. denied, 138 S. Ct. 5 10 
(20 17) (describing a c ircuit di vergence in interpretation of the defin ition of 
"owner" regarding CERC LA liabil ity for sublessors) . 
5 690 F. App 'x 7 10 (2d Cir. 201 7), cert. denied, 138 S. Cl. 5 10 (2017) . 
Id. at 7 12. 
See Next Millennium Realty, LLC, 20 16 WL I 178957 at *2 (fail ing to 
address the lack o f notice or consent by the landlord in fi nding the sublessor no t 
li able as an owner). 
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